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INTRODUCTION
Patients with Alzheimer’s disease have a well-
documented picture naming impairment and some
studies have further revealed the presence of
category specific deficits. Nevertheless, the
incidence and pattern of category-specificity across
Alzheimer’s patients as a group (Silveri et al.,
1991; Tippett et al., 1996), and for individual
Alzheimer’s patients (Mauri et al., 1994; Garrard et
al., 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997; Laws et al.,
2002; Laws et al., 2003) has been inconsistent.
Most have reported living deficits, a minority has
reported nonliving deficits, some report both and
still others find no category specific effects at all in
Alzheimer’s patients. Several questions remain
unanswered including: what factors might
contribute to whether studies do or do not find
category effects; whether a living or nonliving
category effect is reported; and why so many living
cases are reported?
First, category-specific effects may, of course,
be hidden and/or distorted within a group analysis
because individual Alzheimer’s patients have
category effects in opposing directions (i.e. some
living and some nonliving) and so, cancel each
other. In a cross-sectional design, Gonnerman et
al., (1997) reported that the presence of living or
nonliving deficits was related to the degree of
anomia, i.e. patients with less impaired naming
showed a deficit for nonliving things, and those
more severely impaired showed living thing
deficits. While this might explain some variability
across previous studies, two recent studies have
failed to replicate the reported association in larger
samples of Alzheimer’s patients (Zannino et al.,
2002; Garrard et al., 1998). Nevertheless, the
importance of examining individual patients and
their heterogeneity is emphasized as a critical
factor.
It is also notable that previous studies have
examined Alzheimer’s patients within a restricted
range of cognitive ability as indicated by their
MMSE scores (see Table I and below), and a
constrained and distorted range of ability in
controls (see Table II). Indeed, for a long time in
this literature, it has been assumed that patient
performance is an exaggerated version of the
assumed normative profile. Although this
hypothesis had not been explicitly examined, it was
assumed that normal subjects would similarly find
those items more difficult to name which are: less
familiar, have lower name frequencies, greater
visual complexity and so on - in other words,
living things; and this was used to partly explain
the 5:1 ratio for living to nonliving deficits. More
recently, however, evidence has emerged that,
counter to this assumption, it is quite common for
normal subjects to show better naming of living
than nonliving things (for examples using a variety
of paradigms, see: Laws 1999, 2000, 2002; Laws
and Gale 2002, 2002b; Laws and Neve 1999; Laws
et al., 2002). 
In this context, it is essential to also examine
patients with a wider range of impairment than
previously examined (especially with regard to
notions of an interaction between category deficit
and severity e.g. Gonnerman et al., 1997).
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ABSTRACT
Mixed findings have emerged concerning whether category-specific disorders occur in Alzheimer’s disease. Factors that
may contribute to these inconsistencies include: ceiling effects / skewed distributions for control data in some studies;
differences in the severity of cognitive deficit in patients; and differences in the type of analysis (in particular, if and how
controls are used to analyse single case data).We examined picture naming in Alzheimer’s patients and matched elderly
healthy normal controls in three experiments. These experiments used stimuli that did and did not produce ceiling effects /
skewed data in controls. In Experiment 1, we examined for category effects in individual DAT patients using commonly
used analyses for single cases (χ2 and z-scores). The different techniques produced quite different outcomes. In Experiment
2a, we used the same techniques on a different group of patients with similar outcomes. Finally, in Experiment 2b, we
examined the same patients but (a) used stimuli that did not produce ceiling effects / skewed distributions in healthy
controls, and (b) used statistical methods that did not treat the control sample as a population. We found that ceiling effects
in controls may markedly inflate the incidence of dissociations in which living things are differentially impaired and
seriously underestimate dissociations in the opposite direction. In addition, methods that treat the control sample as a
population led to inflation in the overall number of dissociations detected. These findings have implications for the reliability
of category effects previously reported both in Alzheimer patients and in other pathologies. In particular, they suggest that
the greater proportion of living than nonliving deficits reported in the literature may be an artifact of the methods used. 
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Similarly, in those studies that have included
normal controls, their naming is invariably at or
near ceiling (see Table II). These control ceiling
effects probably reflect the widespread reliance
upon simple line drawn stimuli that controls have
little difficulty in naming under normal conditions
(the Snodgrass and Vanderwart corpus is used in
90+% of category specific studies: Laws and Gale
2002a,b). Studies comparing patient performance
with that of ceiling level performance in controls
will distort the findings for patients (including both
the degree and possibly the types of deficit
reported: see Laws et al., 2002, 2003; Fung et al
2001).
Finally, the literature displays a surprising lack
of agreement about the necessary and sufficient
conditions for documenting a category specific
naming disorder (see Laws 1998 for a discussion).
Indeed, a variety of methods for delineating
category effects have been used in studies of
Alzheimer’s patients alone. These include: (a)
within-patient comparison of living and nonliving
naming, but without control data (e.g., Tippett et
al., 1996); (b) within-patient comparison of living
and nonliving naming without control data or
statistical analysis (e.g. Gonnerman et al., 1997);
(c) comparisons of the raw difference scores (i.e.
living minus nonliving) for patients against control
naming cut-offs from a non-matched sample (e.g.
Garrard et al 1998); (d) the comparison of
individual patient scores for living and nonliving
separately using z-scores derived from control data
(e.g. Mauri et al 1994; for problems with this
approach, see Laws et al., 2003); and (e) regression
analyses where control baseline data are included
(Zannino et al., 2002 Laiacona et al., 1998). There
is, therefore, no consensus on how to actually
document, and hence define, a category specific
disorder; this is as true of studies with Alzheimer’s
patients as those with other pathologies (e.g. herpes
simplex encephalitis).
The current study examines the implications of
these issues and proposes an accessible and readily
usable method to rectify some of the problems.
Experiment 1 examines the consequences of
determining category effects when using typical
approaches that either include healthy controls (e.g.
z-scores, ZD) or are limited to within-patient
comparisons (e.g. χ2). Experiment 2a and
Experiment 2b compares naming in a new series of
Alzheimer’s patients with that of healthy controls
who are either performing at ceiling or not.  
Finally and importantly, gender affects both
category naming and category fluency in healthy
controls (see Laws 1999, 2000, 2003) and
Alzheimer’s patients (Laiacona et al., 1998), where
appropriate, all comparisons were with healthy
controls who were matched both for age and for
sex i.e. all z and t-values were referenced from
gender specific comparisons.  
METHODS
Experiments 1 and 2a use methods that are
typically applied to determine the presence of
category effects. The stimuli (from the Snodgrass
and Vanderwart corpus 1980) are those typically
used in category effect studies (Laws and Gale
2002a,b); and the analyses used cover the majority
of approaches to documenting category effects for
individual patients whatever the pathology. We
evaluate the difference outcomes associated with
using and not using control data in determining
category effects (by comparing the outcomes for χ2
versus z-score analyses); and the subsequent
limitations of these approaches with these type of
data. 
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TABLE I
Levels of general cognitive functioning in studies of category specificity in Alzheimer’s Patients
Study General cognitive functioning
Silveri et al., 1991 described as ‘mild’
Montanes et al., 1995 MMSE = 17-26
Tippet et al., 1996 described 9 as mild and 5 as moderate
Gonnerman et al.,1997 MMSE = 19 and 18
Garrard et al., 1998 MMSE = 19.9
Garrard et al., 2001 MMSE = 23.6
Zannino et al., 2002 MMSE = 20.6  
TABLE II
Living and nonliving naming levels for control subjects in studies of category specificity in Alzheimer’s Patients
Study Living Mean (%) Nonliving Mean (%)
Silveri et al., 1991 99.8 99.8
Mauri et al., 1994 98 98
Montanes et al., 1995 96 97
Gonnerman et al., 1997 97 97.2
Garrard et al., 1998 93 97
Garrard et al., 2001 90.5 93.3
Zannino et al., 2002 98 98.3  
The types of statistical analyses also differ widely
across studies, ranging from parametric group
comparisons (which are likely to be inappropriate for
example when controls perform at ceiling as happens
in many category effect studies). At an individual case
level, studies use normal control data e.g. z-scores or
z-score differences (ZD) and within-patient χ2
analyses (being used in approximately 70% of
category-specific studies). In the case of ZD, the
method outlined by Payne and Jones (1957) and
described in Crawford et al. (1998) was used. This
method divides the difference between a patient’s z
scores by the standard deviation of the difference in
the controls (sX – Y) to obtain a z score for the
difference (ZD). The ZD can then be referred to a table
of the areas under the normal curve to test whether it
exceeds the required critical value (i.e., 1.96 for a
two-tailed test). The standard deviation of the
difference is
(1)
where rXY is the correlation between the two tests in
the control sample used to obtain the patient’s z-
scores, and the first value under the square root sign
(2) is the sum of the SDs for the two tests in the control
sample (Z scores have SDs of 1). 
EXPERIMENT 1
Subiects
(a) Alzheimer’s patients (n = 9) 
Nine patients (7 female; 2 male: mean age = 81.1
years) diagnosed with probable Alzheimer’s disease
according to NINCDS-ADRDA criteria (McKhann et
al., 1984). The patients had a mean MMSE (Folstein
et al., 1975) of 13.7 ± 3.74 
(b) Normal healthy elderly participants (n = 12)
Twelve (8 female; 4 male) elderly control subjects
(mean age = 77.9 years), were recruited from drop-in
centres for the elderly (being residents in nursing
s rX Y XY– = 2 2– ,
homes or visitors to community day-centres). All
were screened for good health, and had no history of
head injury, neurological or psychiatric illness, nor
alcohol or drug abuse. 
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
Forty line drawings (depicting 20 living and 20
non-living things: see Appendix 1) were selected from
the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) corpus. The two
sets were matched for familiarity (3.12 vs. 3.16, p =
.85); visual complexity (3.26 vs. 3.25,
p = .95); and name frequency (10.95 vs. 9.55,
p = .7). 
RESULTS
The Alzheimer’s group correctly named 60 ±
19% (60.11 ± 19.28% living and 55 ± 16.97%
nonliving) of the stimuli, while the control group
named 95 ± 6% (94.66 ± 6.13% living and 90.35 ±
9.74% nonliving)1. The difference between living
and nonliving naming scores did not correlate
significantly with overall naming ability (r = .5, p
= .17) or with MMSE (r = .18, p = .64) scores.
Nevertheless, these correlations reflected a narrow
range of quite low MMSE scores in nine patients.
Individual cases
The use of within-patient analysis, using a chi
square test of independence (χ2 ), produced only one
deficit (for nonliving things). By contrast, z scores
showed that all patients except one (A8) were
impaired; all for living things and all except two (A2
and A4) were impaired for nonliving things (see
Table III for comparisons).  However, as the use of
χ2 is essentially aimed at detecting dissociations
(rather than simple deficits) between living and
nonliving things, the most relevant comparison is
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1 The item ‘flute’ was removed from the analysis because it elicited errors
in the majority of control group subjects.
TABLE III
Naming raw scores (and percentages) for Alzheimer’s patients across category, along with significant χ2 and Z-score analyses
(Experiment 1)
Patient Living Nonliving χ2 Za ZDb
A1 5  (25%) 7  (37%) – L + NL L
A2 15  (75%) 14  (74%) – L L
A3 15  (75%) 9  (47%) – L + NL L
A4 11  (55%) 12  (63%) – L L
A5 6  (30%) 6  (32%) – L + NL L
A6 12  (60%) 9  (47%) – L + NL L
A7 18  (90%) 10  (53%) NL L + NL –
A8 19  (95%) 15  (79%) – – –
A9 16  (80%) 12  (63%) – L + NL L
a One-tailed. Eighteen comparisons adjusted using Bonferroni (.05/18 = .0027 i.e. Z > 2.78) 
b Two-tailed. Nine comparisons adjusted using Bonferroni correction 
with the results of the Payne and Jones test (ZD).
Here again, however, the use of within-patient
comparisons (χ2) versus ZD (which involves
referencing the patient’s performance to controls)
yields conclusions that could scarcely be more
different; the Payne and Jones test revealed that all
except two (A7 and A8) patients showed significantly
worse living than nonliving naming.  In contrast, and
as noted, using χ2 only one patient with a dissociation
was detected and this was for nonliving things.
SUMMARY
The main outcomes of this experiment concern:
the different incidence of dissociations reported when
using within (χ2) versus between-subject (ZD)
analyses; and the lack of correspondence between the
direction of absolute score differences and the
direction indicated when patient performance is
referenced to normative data.  
Although very common in the case study
literature, χ2 revealed only one deficit in patient A7
(for nonliving things), who showed the largest
absolute difference of any patient. However,
ironically given the large number of dissociations
detected using the Payne and Jones test in the present
sample, patient A7 did not exhibit a significant
dissociation (i.e. ZD was < 1.96 for this patient).
Therefore, although the direction and magnitude of
living-nonliving differences in patients may look
large, they need not be abnormal. This patently
shows that absolute raw differences (i.e. when
unreferenced to control data) may misrepresent both
the number and the direction of category deficits
reported. A7 would be an interesting case because,
some researchers might consider worse nonliving
than living naming to run counter to the expected
pattern (predicted by familiarity, name frequency and
visual complexity etc) and so, could view A7 as a
clear case of a nonliving deficit. 
EXPERIMENT 2A
Experiment 1 showed how it is necessary to
reference patient data to that of controls otherwise
we are likely to make quite profound errors in
determining category effects. Experiment 2a uses the
same methods outlined in Experiment 1 to examine
category effects in a larger group of less severely ill
Alzheimer’s patients. 
SUBJECTS
(a) Alzheimer’s patients (n =18) 
Eighteen patients (14 female; 4 male: mean age =
77.57 ± 8.22: 77.25 ± 4.79) with probable Alzheimer’s
dementia according to NINCDS-ADRDA criteria
(McKhann et al., 1984) were tested. Their mean
MMSE was 18.03 ± 4.69 (cf. mean MMSE = 13.7 ±
3.74 for patients in Experiment 1). All patients were
living at home and visiting a day-center. 
(b) Normal healthy elderly participants (n = 22)
Twenty-six normal subjects (10 female; 12 male:
mean age = 71.9 ± 4.33: 71.17 ± 3.79) were recruited
through their general practitioner, who screened them
for good health. They had no history of head injury,
neurological or psychiatric illness, or alcohol or drug
abuse. English was the first language for all
participants. 
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
Sixty-four line drawings (see Appendix 1) were
taken from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart corpus
(1980). The pictures comprised 32 living and 32
nonliving items that were matched across category
for familiarity (2.82 vs. 2.97, p = .39; visual
complexity (3.21 vs. 3.09, p = .47) and name
frequency (9.66 vs. 13.23, p = .3). 
RESULTS
As expected, naming was extremely impaired in
the Alzheimer’s patients (66.11 ± 19.8% [65.62 ±
20.31 living and 66.59 ± 21.56 nonliving]) and the
mean naming score for the healthy controls was at
ceiling (95.67 ± 3.97% [95.91 ± 4.31 living and 95.44
± 7.19% nonliving]). Analysis across category at the
group level revealed no difference between living and
nonliving naming for the Alzheimer’s patients. The
correlation between the living-nonliving difference
and overall naming was non-significant (r = –.14, p =
.58). MMSE scores also again failed to correlate with
the difference score (r = – .04, p = .87).
Individual cases
Again χ2 revealed a low incidence of deficits
(2/18: 11%: AF and AH both living deficits)
compared to ZD (6/18: 33%: which included AF and
AH). Also again, the raw score for one patient (AR)
was lower for nonliving than living but AR
nevertheless showed a dissociation in the opposite
direction when scores were referred to control values
using ZD (see Table IV).
SUMMARY
The proportion of deficits was again very
different when comparing the within-patient
method with the use of controls (2 versus 6). The
incidence of dissociations is much lower than that
of the patients in Experiment 1, but this is wholly
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consistent with the lower MMSE scores of that
group. Again, as for Experiment 1, in 2a the
incidence of dissociations documented with χ2 is
much lower than with ZD (being 1:7 and 1:3
respectively). Given that Experiment 1 contained
patients who are more severely ill, this suggests
that the ratio of living: nonliving dissociations will
be more than twice that of less impaired patients.
Experiment 2a documents only dissociations
involving differential impairment for living things.
The finding of the far greater incidence of living
thing cases is consistent with the published
literature (the ratio of living: nonliving being
approximately 5:1 across all pathologies).
The major finding from Experiments 1 and 2a,
however, relates not to the performance of the
patients, but to that of the control subjects. The
ceiling performance of controls will undoubtedly
influence outcomes and makes some analyses
untenable (they are especially likely to distort z-
scores particularly when this is combined with
small sample sizes). Therefore, as a direct
comparison, in Experiment 2b we test the same
patients as Experiment 2a but (a) using stimuli that
do not produce ceiling effects in controls and (b)
we also report results from inferential methods that
are more appropriate than the use of z-scores for
detecting deficits and dissociations.
EXPERIMENT 2B
We have shown in Experiment 1 and 2a that
control data are essential, and that simple
within-patient comparisons are misleading.
Additionally, the use of z-scores with small normative
samples will overestimate the degree of impairment
(and inflate the Type I error rate) in patients because
the statistics of the control sample are treated as
population parameters rather than sample statistics
(see Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002). Hence, new
methods were used to analyse the data in Experiment
2b (outlined below). 
Previous studies comparing naming of
Alzheimer’s patients and normal controls have largely
ignored the fact that normal naming is typically at, or
near, ceiling on simple naming tasks. On the widely
used Snodgrass and Vanderwart corpus (1980) of line
drawings, the range has been very high (93-99%: see
introduction). Indeed, the controls both in Experiment
1 (95 ± 6%) and in Experiment 2a (95.6 ± 3.97%)
performed at ceiling. The statistical methods
employed in Experiments 1 and 2a compare with
those employed in past studies, but will distort the
pattern of findings (because of the ceiling effect in
controls and resultant skewed distribution of scores).
In this experiment, therefore, we compared naming of
the same patients and controls as in Experiment 2, but
on 60 living and 60 nonliving pictures that are graded
in difficulty. The purpose being both to avoid a ceiling
effect in controls and to compare consistency across
stimulus sets within the same patients. 
Method
The data for each individual subject were
examined by comparing performance with controls
using methods described by Crawford and Garthwaite
(2002) for testing for deficits and dissociations in
single-case studies; see also Crawford, Garthwaite
and Gray (2003)2. Initially, patient naming was
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TABLE IV
Naming raw scores (and percentages) for Alzheimer’s patients across category, along with significant χ2 and Z-score analyses
(Experiment 2a)
Patient Living Nonliving χ2 Za ZDb
AA 31  (97%) 30  (94%) – – –
AB 29  (91%) 31  (97%) – – –
AC 29  (91%) 26  (81%) – – –
AD 29  (91%) 25  (78%) – – –
AE 25  (78%) 29  (91%) – L –
AF 18  (56%) 28  (88%) L L L
AG 23  (72%) 23  (72%) – L + NL –
AH 18  (56%) 27  (84%) L L L
AI 21  (66%) 23  (72%) – L + NL –
AJ 24  (75%) 19  (59%) – L + NL –
AK 19  (59%) 22  (69%) – L + NL L
AL 21  (66%) 19  (59%) – L + NL –
AM 19  (59%) 20  (63%) – L + NL –
AN 19  (59%) 17  (53%) – L + NL –
AO 16  (50%) 17  (53%) – L + NL L
AP 14  (44%) 11  (34%) – L + NL –
AQ 11  (34%) 13  (41%) – L + NL L
AR 12  (38%) 9  (28%) – L + NL L
a One-tailed. Thirty-six comparisons adjusted using Bonferroni (.05/36 = .001) 
b Two-tailed. Eighteen comparisons adjusted using Bonferroni correction 
2 An alternative method using parametric and nonparametric tolerance
limits has been proposed by Capitani and colleagues (see Capitani et al.,
1999). Unfortunately, this method relies upon testing very large normative
samples (between 400 and 1000: see Wald 1943; and Mycroft et al., 2002
for a further recent discussion of this method) and so (for pragmatic
reasons) has rarely been used in the general cognitive neuropsychological
literature. In the case of the current study, our numbers of controls are
commensurable or larger than in most similar studies
compared with that of age- and gender-matched
controls for living and nonliving things separately.
This analysis (Crawford and Howell, 1998; Crawford
and Garthwaite, 2002) determines whether an
individual’s score is significantly different from a
control or normative sample and provides a point
estimate of the abnormality of the scores -i.e. it
estimates the percentage of the population that would
obtain a lower score. The formula for this method,
which is essentially a modified independent samples
t-test, is as follows: 
(2)
where s is the control sample standard deviation; X
is the patient’s score, is the mean score for
controls, and N is the size of the normative sample. 
Of course, it is possible for patients to be
impaired at naming living or nonliving things, but
that the difference between their scores does not
reach significance; conversely, a patient may be
severely impaired on both tasks but still show
differential impairment. Therefore, for those
patients showing impaired naming of living and/or
nonliving things, we compared their living-
nonliving discrepancy score with the mean
discrepancy of the normative sample (Crawford et
al., 1998; Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002). This
method tests whether the discrepancy observed for
the patient is significantly different from the
discrepancies observed for controls and provides a
point estimate of the abnormality of the
individual’s discrepancy -i.e. it estimates the
percentage of the population that would obtain a
more extreme discrepancy. The formula for this
method, which is a modified paired samples t-test,
is as follows:
(3)
where ZX and ZY are the individual’s scores on tests
X and Y expressed as z-scores based on the means
and SDs of the controls, and rXY is the correlation
between the test scores for the control sample.
These methods of testing for deficits and for
differences (i.e. dissociations) are to be preferred
over the use of z and ZD as they treat the statistics
of the control sample as statistics rather than as
population parameters3.
Crawford et al. (2003) have recently provided
fully specified criteria for Shallice’s (1988)
classification of ‘strong’ and ‘classical’
dissociations and we employ these in the present
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study. A patient was considered to exhibit a strong
dissociation if they were (a) impaired at naming
both living and nonliving on Crawford and
Howell’s test (one-tailed) and (b) showed a
significant difference (two-tailed) between the two
scores on Crawford et al’s (1998) test. A patient
was considered to exhibit a classical dissociation if
they were impaired at only living or nonliving
naming (one-tailed) and showed a significant
difference (two-tailed) between the impaired and
intact category. Monte Carlo simulations indicated
that using these criteria, the probability of
incorrectly classifying an individual drawn from
the healthy population as exhibiting either of these
types of dissociation is low (Crawford et al., 2003). 
SUBJECTS
The same patients and controls tested in
Experiment 2a. 
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
Participants viewed 120 colour pictures from
the Category Specific Names Test (McKenna 1997;
McKenna and Parry 1994); this included 60 living
and 60 nonliving things that are matched across
category for familiarity (3.31 vs. 3.23, p = .50) and
name frequency (Baayen et al 1993: 37.3 vs. 32.5,
p = .67). The 30 pictures in each category were
presented in order of normative naming-difficulty.
A list of items can be found in Appendix 1.
RESULTS
Skewness and kurtosis statistics (g1 and g2)
were computed for the male and female healthy
control data. Skewness for males for living stimuli
was –0.85 and was 0.24 for nonliving stimuli.
D’Agostino et al. (1990) test for skewness failed to
reject the null hypothesis that the distributions were
symmetrical; zg1 = 1.36 , p = 0.177 for living, and
zg1 = 0.39, p = 0.69 for nonliving. Further,
D’Agostino’s omnibus test for normality, which
uses both g1 and g2 as input, revealed that the
distributions did not differ significantly from
normality; K2 = 2.18, p = 0.34 for living things,
and K2 = 2.18, p = 0.34 for living things.
In female controls, skewness for living stimuli
was – 0.22 and was – 0.61 for nonliving stimuli.
The distributions did not contain significant
asymmetry; zg1 = 0.33, p = 0.74 for living, and zg1 =
– 0.91, p = 0.36 for nonliving. Also, as was the
case for the male controls, the distributions did not
depart significantly from normality using the
omnibus test; K2 = 1.65, p = 0.44 for living things,
and K2 = 1.64, p = 0.44 for living things. Thus,
unlike the stimulus sets used in experiments 1 and
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3 Programs to run these analyses can be downloaded from
http://www.abdn.ac.uk/∼psy086/dept/psychom.htm
2a (and those used in previous studies), this
demonstrates that it is clearly possible to obtain
stimulus sets that yield normally distributed scores
in controls.
Naming was again extremely impaired in these
Alzheimer’s patients (23.1%). As expected, the
mean naming score for healthy controls was below
ceiling (73.1%). Analysis across category at the
group level revealed no difference between living
and nonliving naming for either the Alzheimer’s
patients (14.78 ± 10.25 vs. 12.94 ± 9.65) or healthy
controls (44.57 ± 7.2 vs. 44.92 ± 5.03). Again
contrary to Gonnerman et al (1997) the correlation
between the living-nonliving difference and naming
ability failed to reach significance (r = –.11, p =
.67) as did the correlation of MMSE scores with
the difference score (r = .05, p = .85). 
Individual cases
As in the previous experiments, analyses
involving the comparison of individual patients
with control data were conducted using gender
matched controls cases. The mean score of female
controls on living things was 46.20 (SD = 5.85)
and was 45.50 (SD = 3.37) for nonliving things;
the correlation between living and nonliving scores
was 0.597. The mean score for male controls was
46.50 (SD = 6.91) on living things and was 46.75
(SD = 4.05) for nonliving things; the correlation
between living and nonliving scores was 0.262.
As in the previous experiments, χ2 produced a
low incidence of deficits (3/18). By contrast,
almost all patients were impaired on z-scores and
single t-test analyses of living and nonliving
naming separately. On the ZD analysis, 14 patients
showed significantly greater impairment (i.e.
dissociations) for nonliving versus living things.
This number was higher than the equivalent results
obtained from the modified t-test: using this latter
method, 10 patients exhibited significantly greater
impairment for nonliving things (see Table V). The
higher incidence obtained from the use of ZD
reflects an inflation of the Type I error rate
(because ZD inappropriately treats the control
sample as a population).
SUMMARY
The most striking finding from Experiment 2b
was the incidence of differential deficits for
nonliving things i.e. all 10/18 impaired patients
were significantly more impaired for nonliving
things. This contrasts strongly with the outcomes in
Experiments 1 and 2a; and consequently with the
prevailing 5:1 ratio of living: nonliving deficits
recorded in the literature. 
The second notable feature concerns the fact
that some methods managed to produce a patient
with a paradpxoc deficit across stimuli (for z-scores
see AE and for ZD see AQ). Indeed, all the living
cases found in Experiment 2a either disappeared or
became nonliving cases in Experiment 2b (see
Table VI which for convenience combines the
results of Experiment 2a and 2b).
Furthermore, the incidence of different category
deficits may relate to the stimuli used – i.e.
Experiment 2a produced 6 living thing deficits and
Experiment 2b produced none; however
Experiment 2b produced twice as many nonliving
deficits as Experiment 2a. Hence the use of the
Snodgrass and Vanderwart stimuli and the
accompanying ceiling naming for controls may
inflate the number of living thing deficits.
As with Experiment 1 and 2a, no evidence for a
double dissociation (either classical or strong)
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TABLE V
Naming raw scores (and percentages) for Alzheimer’s patients across category, along with significant χ2 and z-score analyses
(Experiment 2b)
Patient Living Nonliving χ2 Za ZDb Modified independent Modified paired
t-testa t-testb
AA 34  (57%) 27  (45%) - NL - NL -
AB 33  (55%) 34  (57%) - NL - - -
AC 23  (38%) 14  (23%) - L+NL NL NL Strong NL
AD 21  (35%) 7  (12%) NL L+NL NL L+NL Strong NL
AE 31  (52%) 26  (43%) - NL NL NL -
AF 10  (17%) 23  (38%) L L+NL - L+NL -
AG 11  (18%) 7  (12%) - L+NL NL L+NL Strong NL
AH 14  (23%) 18  (30%) - L+NL - L+NL -
AI 5  (8%) 4  (7%) - L+NL NL L+NL Strong NL
AJ 22  (37%) 16  (27%) - L+NL NL NL Strong NL
AK 12  (20%) 10  (17%) - L+NL NL L+NL Strong NL
AL 13  (22%) 14  (23%) - L+NL NL L+NL -
AM 12  (20%) 15  (25%) - L+NL NL L+NL -
AN 10  (17%) 7  (12%) - L+NL NL L+NL Strong NL
AO 3  (5%) 6  (10%) - L+NL NL L+NL Strong NL
AP 3  (5%) 2  (3%) - L+NL NL L+NL Strong NL
AQ 4  (7%) 0  (0%) NL L+NL NL L+NL Strong NL
AR 5  (8%) 3  (5%) - L+NL NL L+NL -
a One-tailed. Thirty-six comparisons adjusted using Bonferroni (.05/36 = .001) 
b Two-tailed. Eighteen comparisons adjusted using Bonferroni correction
emerged in Experiment 2b. It is notable, however,
that the one method that did produce a double
dissociation was the within-patient (χ2) method
(see AD and AQ versus AF [nonliving versus
living]; though AQ was at floor almost). AD and
AF do provide evidence of a double dissociation as
it is often defined in the category specific
literature. It is also clear that AF’s living deficit
disappears when referenced to control data. While
AF showed a living deficit in Experiment 2a using
all methods, AQ showed a contradictory deficit on
Experiment 2a and AD showed none at all on
Experiment 2a.
Finally, Experiment 2b indicates that the
incidence of living and nonliving thing deficits
may have been exaggerated and underestimated
respectively. Thus, providing a possible explanation
for the disproportionate number of living compared
to nonliving deficits reported in this literature.
DISCUSSION
These experiments highlight the importance of
methodological issues concerning how we measure
and define category specific effects. In particular,
issues relating to (a) how the failure to use control
subjects will distort the outcomes, creating Type I
and II errors; and (b) that when controls are
included, the typical performance of controls on
the typical test materials will distort the deficit
incidence across the two categories. By contrast,
when patients are examined against controls whose
naming is below ceiling, a quite different profile
emerges for patients and in particular a greater
incidence of nonliving deficits.
As already noted, studies of Alzheimer’s patients
have varied according to whether they used a control
group and how the control data was used in analyses.
Examination of the living-nonliving difference score
(without reference to normal control data) does occur
in studies of category effects in Alzheimer’s patients
(e.g. Gonnerman et al., 1997) and is if anything, the
norm in studies of category-specific disorders
resulting from other pathologies (Laws, in press).
The current study, however, confirms that individual
difference scores – if not considered in the context
of control data – will produce both Type I (false
positives) and Type II errors (false negatives). For
example, Experiment 1 showed that the largest
difference (A7: 90% living vs. 53% nonliving) was
not significant when referenced to the naming of
normal subjects (a potential false positive). By
contrast, another patient (A5) showing no absolute
difference in living and nonliving naming (30% vs.
31%) displayed a significant category deficit for
living things (a potential false negative). Hence, the
absolute size of difference between the ability of
patients to name living and nonliving things will be
misleading (be it exceptionally large or small) unless
referenced to the normal naming pattern for that
specific stimulus set. This is critical because the
absolute difference in numbers of living and
nonliving things named is very frequently used to
define category-naming deficits in the category
specific literature (and verified using χ2). Laws (in
press) found that this was the common practice in
more than 80% of case studies examining category-
specific deficits.
Nevertheless, all three experiments demonstrate
how that the level of performance in the controls is
critical. Examining patients of different severity and
using methods and materials that are quite typical of
this literature, Experiments 1 and 2a show that the
concomitant ceiling effects in controls distort the
incidence of category effects. In particular, both
Experiment 1 and 2a indicate that when patient
performance is referenced to control data that has a
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TABLE VI
Category deficits in Alzheimer’s patients (Comparing Experiment 2a and 2b)
Experiment 2a Experiment 2b
Sex χ2 Z ZD χ2 Z ZDa Dissociation  
AA M – – – – NL – –
AB M – – – – – – –
AC F – – – – NL NL Strong NL
AD F – – – NL NL NL Strong NL
AE F – L – – NL NL –
AF M L L L L L + NL – –
AG F – L + NL – – L + NL NL Strong NL
AH F L L L – L + NL – –
AI F – L + NL – – L + NL NL Strong NL
AJ F – L + NL – – NL NL Strong NL
AK F – L + NL L – L + NL NL Strong NL
AL F – L + NL – – L + NL NL –
AM F – L + NL – – L + NL NL –
AN F – L + NL – – L + NL NL Strong NL
AO F – L + NL L – L + NL NL Strong NL
AP F – L + NL – – L + NL NL Strong NL
AQ F – L + NL L NL L + NL NL Strong NL
AR M – L + NL L – L + NL NL – 
a Two-tailed. Eighteen comparisons adjusted using Bonferroni correction 
ceiling effect, this dramatically increases the
incidence of category effects (compared to within-
patient comparisons of living and nonliving naming).
Indeed χ2 produces a small deficit incidence when
compared to ZD referenced deficits levels(Experiment 1: 1 vs. 7; Experiment 2a: 2 vs. 6). 
Given the different level of abilities of the
patients in Experiment 1 and 2a, the findings are not
restricted to patients with a specific level of
cognitive functioning  (the level of cognitive
functioning did not relate to the category of deficits,
just the proportion reported i.e. being greater in more
severely impaired patients). Within-patient χ2
produced few deficits (3 in 27 patients), while ZD
produced (13/27 deficits). Moreover, the
overwhelming majority of differential deficits (using
both methods) were for living things (15/16 deficits)
in Experiments 1 and 2a. By contrast, Experiment 2b
(with the same patients and controls as 2a, but
without the ceiling effect) exclusively documented
differential deficits for nonliving naming. Hence it
seems that highly accurate (i.e. ceiling or near-
ceiling) control performance will distort the
incidence of category effects documented insofar as
it increases the number of living deficits and
underestimates the incidence of nonliving deficits.
Certainly our data suggest that the widespread use of
simple line drawings – when referenced to ceiling
effects in controls – will exaggerate the presence of
living thing deficits. Given that the same stimuli and
types of analysis are widely used in 90+% of studies
of category specificity within other patient groups
(see Laws and Gale 2002a, b; Laws in press), these
limitations may be quite widespread in the literature.  
It should be stressed that the approach taken in
Experiment 2b was aimed at dealing with two
distinct problems; the problem of skewed data
/ceiling level performance in controls and the use of
methods (i.e. z and ZD) that treat the control sample
a population. The present use of modified t-tests to
compare individual patients with controls was used
to address the second of these problems; it would be
just as inappropriate to use modified t-tests with
obviously non-normal data as it is to use methods
based on z-scores (Crawford and Garthwaite, 2002;
Crawford et al., 2003). Hence, the statistical methods
advocated here are not proposed as remedies for the
first problem referred to above; rather the remedy is
to employ stimuli that do not produce a ceiling effect
and skewed distributions in the control sample (Laws
et al., 2003).
Furthermore, although the analyses in
Experiment 2b highlighted how intra-individual
methods of analysis (i.e. a χ2 test on a patient’s living
and nonliving raw scores) can lead to erroneous
conclusions, readers may be concerned that
erroneous conclusions could also follow from
application of the methods we advocate. In
particular, it may be of concern that relatively small
differences in raw scores (and even, as in Case AO,
raw scores that are higher on the task recorded as
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more impaired) can lead to significant results and a
patient being classified as exhibiting a dissociation.
The living raw score for Case AO was 3 and the
nonliving score was 6 and yet this patient fulfilled
the criterion for a strong nonliving dissociation (i.e.,
performance on nonliving naming was more
impaired than living). Part of such a concern is
misplaced because the raw scores are misleading.
The raw score for Case AO on living things when
expressed as a z score based on the mean and SD of
female controls was – 7.39 whereas the nonliving z
score was – 11.72 (the nonliving score is more
extreme because the control SD for nonliving items
was smaller than that for living things).
It does, however, remain true that when a
patient’s performance on both tasks is very extreme
(i.e. near floor: as with Case AO and three other
cases in the present study i.e., AI, AP and AQ), the
results of any classification method for dissociations
should be treated with caution. That is, although the
statistical tests may indicate a dissociation, the
heuristic validity of such evidence is debatable. An
assertion about differential nonliving deficits would,
of course, be less compelling if based solely on cases
such as the four described above.  Nevertheless,
differential deficits in nonliving naming were also
observed for six other cases in whom performance
was well above floor; as such, the pattern recorded
in the extreme cases is consistent with the pattern
observed in less impaired cases.
In applying Crawford et al.’s (2003) criteria for
dissociations, we used three t-tests to infer the
presence of a dissociation (tests were performed on a
patient’s living and non-living scores separately and
a further test was applied to test whether the
difference between the living and non-living scores
was significant). An anonymous referee suggested
that a potentially more parsimonious approach would
be to apply a single test that made use of Hotelling’s
T 2 distribution. However, such a test would tell us
only whether, overall, the patient differed from
controls, but not if there was a dissociation
(Hotelling’s test would find the weighted composite
of the two tasks that achieves the optimal
discrimination between patient and controls) That is,
a patient who performed very poorly but
equivalently relative to controls on living and
non-living naming would yield a significant result
on Hotelling’s test4.  
The main conclusions of the present study are
that the consistency and reliability of category
effects in Alzheimer’s patients (and by implication,
4 The suggestion of using Hotelling’s T2 distribution in comparing an
individual patient’s performance against controls is, however, an interesting
one. Several potentially useful applications can be envisaged. For example,
Crawford and Garthwaite (2003) have developed methods for testing
whether the slope of patient’s regression line is significantly different from
a control sample.  This work could be extended to test whether the
combination of the slope of the patient’s regression line and its intercept
differed from controls.  Hotelling’s T2 would be ideally suited to this
purpose i.e. to providing a test on whether, overall, the patient’s regression
line was abnormal.
those with other pathologies) – are strongly
influenced by: (a) the presence or absence of a
control group; and (b) the presence or absence of
ceiling effects /skew in the control data, and (c) the
inferential method used to compare each patient
with controls. These findings cast doubt upon the
reliability of some previously reported category
specific cases (at least as far as naming is
concerned) in Alzheimer patients and in other
pathologies. In this context, we would suggest that
the findings from Experiment 2b are more likely to
reflect something approaching a reliable pattern of
results since (a) controls were used rather than
drawing inferences from within-patient analysis of
raw scores, (b) the controls performed comparably
across categories and well below ceiling (≅ 75%),
and (c) the inferential methods used to compare
patient with controls are to be preferred over the
use of z and ZD for reasons outlined earlier.
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APPENDIX
Stimuli in Experiment 1
Banana Airplane
Butterfly Axe
Camel Bicycle
Carrot Bus
Cat Chisel
Chicken Drum
Corn Flute
Cow Glove
Frog Guitar
Grapes Helicopter
Mushroom Kettle
Onion Motorbike
Pear Piano
Pineapple Pliers
Spider Rolling-pin
Squirrel Screwdriver
Strawberry Sledge
Duck Stool
Ear Tie
Elephant Violin
Stimuli in Experiment 2a
Apple Anchor
Banana Axe
Camel Barn
Carrot Barrel
Cat Basket
Celery Bike
Cherry Broom
Cow Button
Dog Chair
Duck Chisel
Eagle Cigar
Elephant Couch
Fish Crown
Fox Drum
Frog Glove
Goat Hammer
Gorilla Helicopter
Grapes Kite
Kangaroo Nail
Mouse Needle
Onion Peg
Ostrich Pliers
Owl Plug
Pear Pram
Penguin Rollerskate
Pig Ruler
Pineapple Sledge
Potato Thimble
Rhino Train
Squirrel Umbrella
Tomato Windmill
Zebra Yacht
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Stimuli in Experiment 2b
Mushrooms Bat Darts Passport
Cucumber Robin Cracker Calendar
Pineapple Fox Binoculars Thermometer
Corn Squirrel Cue Barrel
Rhubarb Whale Confetti Cushion
Peach Hedgehog Whisk Skittles
Cauliflower Rhinoceros Hand Grenade Grate
Pepper Eagle Tambourine Wreath
Celery Eel Triangle Crate
Spring Onion Badger Mangle Mould
Radish Hippopotamus Decanter Weather Vane
Cress Hare Cymbals Lantern
Garlic Ostrich Soda Syphon Milk Churn
Marrow Walrus Plane Barometer
Turnip Gorilla Plunger Globe
Melon Pheasant Wash-Board Snorkel
Broccoli Flamingo Crossbow Bust
Beansprouts Armadillo Scuttle Doily
Kiwi Fruit Mole Palette Belisha Beacon
Courgettes Platypus Mallet Cameo
Grapefruit Porcupine Ladle Fez
Avocado Hyena Maracca Casserole
Ginger Vulture Tankard Boater
Aubergine Otter Kaleidoscope Demijohn
Artichoke Toucan Parasol Cauldron
Lychee Puffin Bugle Seal
Mango Beaver Tureen Jardinière
Chicory Kiwi Mortar and Pestle Water Butt
Fennel Lynx Foil Topi
Passion Fruit Wildebeest Besom Tantalus
